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Chapter 1: Introduction, Concepts and Topic 
 
Introduction 
Climate change has been recognised as a “common concern of humankind”1 – a phenomenon that will 
affect every state and person. In its Fifth Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) “unequivocally confirmed that climate change is real and that human-made greenhouse 
gas emissions are its primary cause.”2. The effects of climate change will unfold throughout the 21st 
century and are already being felt in many parts of the world. Continuing along the path that we have 
taken to arrive at this point will result in far-reaching grievous consequences for large swathes of the 
world’s population. The impacts of climate change are predicted to include: “increased severe weather 
events both in terms of severity and frequency, water scarcity, food scarcity, desertification, increased 
wildfires, sea level rise due to melting glaciers and thermal expansion of oceans, ocean acidification, 
and its consequent impact on small island states, displacement due to climate change both internally 
and across borders, and potential conflicts over natural resources.”3 The IPCC predicts with high 
confidence that projected trends in global warming will increase the number of people suffering death, 
disease, hunger, malnutrition, and injury from heat waves, floods, storms, fires, and droughts and 
without improved protection coastal flooding could grow tenfold by the 2080s, affecting more than 100 
million people annually.4 Undoubtedly, the worst impacts of climate change will be felt by the most 
vulnerable groups in society, such as those living in poverty, indigenous peoples and women5, and by 
developing states who historically have contributed the least to global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.6  
                                                          
1 UNFCCC (1992), Preamble, Para 1 
2 “Human Rights and Climate Change”. OHCHR.  
3 Atapattu and Schapper. “From UNFCCC to Paris Agreement: A Human Rights Assessment” in “Human Rights 
and The Environment: Key Issues” (2019). Ch. 9, 208.  
4 Knox. “Climate Change and Human Rights Law” (2009). Virginia Journal of International Law, 50(1), 165 
5 Elliot and Cook. “Climate Justice and the Use of Human Rights Law in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” 
(2016). Quaker United Nations Office, 6-7 
6 Ibid, 6. Note: While historically emissions have come primarily from developed countries, there is a section of 
rapidly industrializing developing countries that have also become responsible for huge emissions such as 
China, India and Brazil. Emissions per capita remain highest in developed countries, but total emissions by 
developing countries overtook developed states in the early 21st century.  
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The scale of the potential human rights impacts of climate change are astounding. Up to an 
additional 600 million people could face hunger by 2080 due to climate change.7 Even if the global 
temperature rises no more than 2°C, one in seven people in the world will face a severe reduction in 
water resources.8 Between 2008 and 2015, 157.8 million people were forced from their homes in the 
past seven years as a result of extreme weather.9 It is also estimated that between 2030 and 2050, 
climate change is expected to cause approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year, from 
malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress.10 
As a threat to global security and prosperity, climate change has a multitude of effects on the 
protection and fulfilment of human rights. Some are direct effects such as in the case of damage caused 
by rising sea levels, extreme weather events and natural disasters brought about by climate change.11 
Others are more indirect ripple effects or slow onset effects such as in terms of the right to health caused 
by deteriorating underlying social and environmental determinants of health and increases in food, 
water and vector-borne diseases,12 or violations of the rights of indigenous peoples through state 
responses to climate change that would affect indigenous lands, livelihoods and way of life.13 Former 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson has called climate change the “greatest threat 
to human rights in twenty-first century”.14 As a result, the consequences of unmitigated climate change 
cannot be underestimated and states must act quickly to both minimize the potential catastrophic effects 
of climate change while also preparing societies to become more resilient in the face of a harsh new 
climate reality.   
A joint statement by human rights NGO Amnesty International and environmental NGO 
Greenpeace in the lead-up to the 21st Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention 
                                                          
7 Greenpeace and Amnesty International. “Joint Statement: Protection of human rights from climate change 
requires urgent shift to 100% renewable energy for all.” (2015). 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 “Climate Change and Health” (2018). World Health Organization.  
11 Lanyi. “Human Rights and Climate Change: An Unlikely Relationship?” (2012). Alternative Law Journal 37(4), 
269 
12 Hesselman and Toebes. “The Human Right to Health and Climate Change: A Legal Perspective” (2015). 
Global Health Law Groningen Research Paper, 1.  
13 See: Scott and Smith. “Sacrifice Zones in the New Green Economy: The ‘New’ Climate Refugees” (2017). 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 26(2), 371-382.  
14 UN Human Rights Council. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations 
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment”. (2016). UN Doc 
A/HRC/31/52, Para 23.  
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on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris stressed the imminent danger to human rights as well as the 
urgent need for a sustainable energy transition, away from fossil fuel use toward a 100% renewable 
energy future by 2050, in order to protect human rights from the devastating effects of climate change.15 
Renewable energy has a key role to play in the fight against climate change as “the main human activity 
that emits CO2 is the combustion of fossil fuels for energy”.16 As a result, transitioning away from fossil 
fuel use and the harmful GHG emissions that come with it, toward utilising cleaner, low-emission 
renewable energy sources becomes a matter of paramount importance and urgency.  
 
Thesis and Roadmap 
The international climate regime and human rights regime has not historically seen much integration 
with one another, but recent trends, especially the adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement which contains 
specific mentions of human rights, provides an opportunity for mutual reinforcement and synergies. 
Climate change will inherently have human rights impacts and similarly, the fight against climate 
change, including the transition toward adopting a renewable energy future, must take into full 
consideration the protection of human rights.  This paper seeks to contribute to the developing 
understanding of the nexus between climate action and human rights, especially focusing on 
sustainable energy transitions as a potent means of combatting climate change. There are thus two 
research questions that this essay considers. Firstly, what is the nexus between climate mitigation 
and human rights? This question requires a deeper understanding of the effects of climate change on 
substantive human rights and why climate change mitigation, of which an energy transition is a key 
strategy, is imperative. It will also consider the legal obligations stemming from both international human 
rights law and the international climate regime in order to identify potential areas of harmonization in 
order to protect human rights. The second question asks how does the sustainable energy transition 
interact with human rights obligations? While the energy transition is necessary for the long-term 
protection and enjoyment of human rights, the transition process must also be mindful of human rights 
and not lead to further violations.  
                                                          
15 Greenpeace and Amnesty International. “Joint Statement: Protection of human rights from climate change 
requires urgent shift to 100% renewable energy for all.” (2015).  
16 Steg, Perlaviciute and van der Werff.  “Understanding the Human Dimensions of a Sustainable Energy 
Transition”. (2015). Frontiers in Psychology 6(805), 2.  
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The importance of climate change as a developing field of study within the human rights 
framework cannot be stressed enough. As mentioned before, climate change represents a global threat 
to security, prosperity and human rights. As a result, efforts to combat the effects of climate change 
require greater attention from the human rights community. The linkages between energy and human 
rights as it stands are wholly underdeveloped. Energy was integrated into the development and poverty 
eradication framework with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, nearly 
30 years after the Brundtland Report which first coined the concept of sustainable development. The 
Brundtland report recognised that it would be unsustainable for developing nations to adopt the same 
energy path that developed nations have pursued in the past, and that states would have to seek ways 
to develop without major reliance on fossil fuels (known as “energy leapfrogging”).17 As energy becomes 
central to discussions of climate mitigation as well as sustainable development, discussions regarding 
the human rights impacts and benefits of the sustainable energy transition and a renewable energy 
future can be considered timely and can contribute to greater understanding of the harmonization 
required between the climate regime and human rights law.  
The rest of this chapter will focus on explaining a few key concepts central to the understanding 
of the discussion in the rest of the paper. Chapter 2 will focus on the legal framework of the two regimes 
considered in this paper. It will discuss the normative substance of some of the substantive rights 
considered, as well as a brief overview of relevant international human rights law concepts. It will also 
provide some background to the key developments in the international climate regime, presenting an 
overview of where the current climate regime legal framework stands following the 2015 Paris 
Agreement. Chapter 3 considers the nexus of climate action and human rights, including the current 
synergies between the two regimes. Central to this will be an understanding of the obligations stemming 
from both Paris as well as relevant human rights obligations and avenues for mutual reinforcement and 
complementarity. Chapter 4 looks at the sustainable energy transition: what it is, what it encompasses 
and what are its effects on various individual human rights, including the right to health and the right to 
housing. Chapter 5 will elaborate this discussion by talking about more cross-cutting issues such as 
gender, equity between developed and developing states and extractive economies and finally 
                                                          
17 Bradbrook. “Sustainable Energy Law: The Past and the Future”. (2012). Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law 30(4), 512.  
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conclude the essay by summarizing the key messages of the paper as well as contemplating future 
avenues of integration.  
 
Key Concepts and Definitions 
Before moving further, a few key concepts used throughout this paper must be defined. The first of 
which is Climate Action. Climate Action is included in the 2030 SDG Agenda as Goal 13 and put simply 
is actions taken to combat climate change and its impacts. Its targets within the SDG framework include 
strengthening resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards, integrating climate change 
measures into national policies, improving education and capacity on climate change, mobilizing 
finance to support the needs of developing countries in combatting climate change and promoting 
mechanisms for raising capacity of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) for effective climate change planning.18 For the purposes of this essay, climate action will 
refer to actions taken by states, both nationally and internationally, to combat climate change.   
Climate Justice is a framework for linking human rights, development and principles of justice 
and equity to “achieve a people-centred approach to the climate crisis safeguarding the rights of the 
most vulnerable and sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change […] equitably and fairly.”19 
Climate justice seeks to inform the discourse on rising GHG emissions and climate change into a rights-
based movement to protect those at the frontline of climate change. As mentioned before, historically 
speaking, the developed countries who have contributed the least to climate change will fact the 
greatest impacts while lacking the resources and capacity to adapt to a bleaker climate reality. 
Paradoxically, these countries need to develop to face the challenge, which in our current carbon-based 
economy means greater fossil fuel use and greater GHG emissions.20 This is the problem climate justice 
seeks to inform – how can we equitably ensure human rights and sustainable development in 
developing states while also effectively combatting climate change. 
                                                          
18 UN General Assembly. “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (2015). UN 
Doc A/RES/70/1, 23 
19 Alam, Bhatia and Mawby. “Women and Climate Change: Impact and Agency in Human Rights, Security, and 
Economic Development” (2015). Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, 12. 
20 Humphreys. “Climate Justice – The Claim of the Past” (2014). Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 
5, 135-136 
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The Sustainable Energy Transition is a central topic of this thesis but what does it actually 
mean? While this paper will go into greater detail on what the sustainable energy transition 
encompasses, it is worth defining briefly here for clarity. The most basic definition would be a 
substitution of technologies and associated fuel inputs across the full set of energy subsectors and 
consumption, from technologies that emit substantial volumes of GHGs to technologies with limited or 
zero emissions.21 In layman’s terms, this refers to the phasing out of fossil fuels in both energy 
production and consumption and the large-scale adoption of renewable energy sources. As will be 
displayed later, there are several issues with this transition including in implementation in a manner that 
protects human rights, as well as issues with emissions along supply chains and in implementation that 
make certain renewable energy practices not as clean as one would believe.  
Transitioning to cleaner energy is an important aspect of Mitigation, one of the key pillars of 
the international climate regime. Mitigation refers to efforts to lower emissions and reducing current 
concentration of CO2 from the atmosphere by enhancing carbon sinks (such as forests).22 Examples 
of this could be protecting and increasing the size of forests, using electric cars and of course, using 
renewable energy for energy production. This is different to Adaptation, which refers to adjustments in 
ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their 
effects or impacts in order to moderate potential damages or benefit from opportunities associated with 
climate change.23 This essay deals primarily with mitigation, but both mitigation and adaptation make 
up fundamental pillars of the international climate regime.  
Lastly, we must consider Climate Finance, which is another central piece of the international 
climate change architecture. Climate finance refers to local, national or transnational financing—drawn 
from public, private and alternative sources of financing—that seeks to support mitigation and 
adaptation actions.24  One of the objectives of the Paris Agreement is outlined as “making finance flows 
consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development”25 and Article 
9 of the Paris Agreement sets out relevant obligations regarding climate finance. Historically, climate 
finance had been limited to public financial flows from developed to developing country parties but the 
                                                          
21 Arent, Arndt, Miller, Tarp and Zinamen. “Introduction and Synthesis” in “The Political Economy of Clean 
Energy Transitions” (2017), Ch.1, 3 
22 “Introduction to Mitigation” UNFCCC.  
23 “What do adaptation to climate change and climate resilience mean?” UNFCCC.  
24 “Introduction to Climate Finance” UNFCCC. 
25 Paris Agreement (2015), Art 2.1(c)  
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Paris Agreement adds the concept of the mobilization of climate finance as a global effort, which 
includes leveraging private financial flows by public interventions to address the needs of developing 
countries and efforts taken by all parties to channel public financial resources and leverage private 
finance domestically.26  
An understanding of the central concepts of the international climate regime is necessary to 
analyse the ways in which it interacts with human rights, and the concepts described above will all be 
elaborated on throughout this paper. The next chapter focuses on the legal framework of both the 
climate regime and the normative frameworks of the individual human rights considered as affected by 
climate mitigation and sustainable energy transitions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Gastelumendi and Gnittke. “Climate Finance (Article 9)” in Klein et al. (eds) “The Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change: Analysis and Commentary” (2017), Ch. 14, 239 
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Chapter 2: Normative Legal Framework  
 
Before moving into the analysis of the nexus between climate action and human rights and analysing 
how sustainable energy transitions interact with human rights norms, it is important to elaborate on the 
normative legal framework of both the international climate regime and human rights law. This chapter 
will provide a deeper understanding of the three main documents under the climate regime: the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and finally the 2015 Paris Agreement. It will talk briefly about the 
development of the international climate change architecture, and the progressive development of 
states’ obligations under it, as well as unique features of the framework such as the Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities principle (CBDR). A brief discussion of the norms and obligations of the 
various relevant substantive human rights will follow, namely the right to health, the right to housing, 
the right to work, the right to benefit from scientific progress, and the rights of indigenous peoples. As 
we will see later, the latter two have key roles in ensuring that mitigation actions and a sustainable 
energy transition do not end up causing further human rights violations. The chapter will end with an 
outline of the procedural guarantees afforded to the victims of human rights violations, and how these 
can be used to reinforce climate action.   
 
The International Climate Regime 
Climate Change entered the international political conscience in the 1970s during the first UN 
Conference on the Human Environment, the 1972 Stockholm Conference. “Climate science developed 
into a core input to political decision-making in 1988 when governments created the IPCC on the 
recommendation of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO).”27 Climate change was accepted as a major global concern in 1992, with the 
adoption of the UNFCCC by 166 governments, with the goal to stabilize GHG emissions “at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.28 “It set the broad 
framework for further action, including establishing an institutional framework and some broad 
objectives and commitments.”29 Since 1995 with the first COP in Berlin, governments have been 
                                                          
27 Ivanova “Politics, Economics and Society” in Klein et al. (eds) “The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: 
Analysis and Commentary” (2017), Ch. 1.B, 17.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Atapattu and Schapper (n3), 205 
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assembling annually to coordinate action in abating climate change. In 1997 at COP 3, governments 
agreed to the Kyoto Protocol which set emission reduction targets for developed countries only.30 This 
was the first step in imposing binding obligations on state parties regarding climate action.31 Neither the 
UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol carried any mention of human rights, and any focus on vulnerability in 
Kyoto was in relation to states, not individuals or groups.32  
The low point of the international climate regime came in Copenhagen in 2009, where at COP 
15 no legally binding agreement could be reached.33 The Copenhagen Accord, a document that 
delegations at COP 15 agreed to “take note of” instead of adopting34, is the first mention in a (soft) legal 
text of what the limit that constitutes “dangerous anthropogenic interference” looks like.35 The limit of 
2°C had been agreed on by scientists for a while, and only six years later in Paris was this entered into 
a legally binding setting. In fact, the Paris Agreement displayed its level of ambition by also obligating 
states to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.36 This 
ambition did not emerge out of nowhere in those six years between Copenhagen and Paris. As Ivanova 
states, climate action has “opened opportunities to imagine a new, low carbon economy and a new, 
resilient society” and in those six years the political context shifted from a focus on obstacles and a 
“desire to impede progress” to a focus on opportunity and commitment to facilitate it”.37 While the 
political will has translated to greater rhetorical ambition, how have the actual obligations and principles 
evolved within the three core documents?  
 
UNFCCC 
The UNFCCC, adopted in 1992, is the founding treaty of the international climate change regime. It 
entered into force in early 1994 and now enjoys near universal membership with 197 state parties.38 As 
mentioned before, the UNFCCC set the framework for further coordinated action and establish the core 
parameters that would guide international climate action in the following decades. It established an 
                                                          
30 Ivanova (n27), 17 
31 Atapattu and Schapper (n3), 205 
32 Ibid, 208 
33 Ivanova (n27), 17 
34 Werksman. “"Taking Note" of the Copenhagen Accord: What It Means” (2009) World Resources Institute 
35 Atapattu and Schapper (n3), 207 
36 Paris Agreement (2015), Art 2.1(a) 
37 Ivanova (n27), 22. 
38 Depledge. “The Legal and Policy Framework of the United Nations Climate Change Regime” in Klein et al. 
(eds) “The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary” (2017), Ch. 2.A, 28 
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“ultimate objective”, both for itself and “any related legal instruments” and specified that parties to the 
treaty should be guided by, amongst other things, “equity” and CBDR.39 Both these principles have 
been the matter of controversy and debate.  
At this point it is worth noting what CBDR actually is. The CBDR principle is rooted in equity 
and fairness and considers the disparities in power and capacity in the international arena. “The CBDR 
takes this disparity into account both in relation to the contribution to creating environmental problems 
and the ability to address them.”40 The three fundamental distinctions between developed and 
developing countries reflected in the regime are: different historical responsibility and different relative 
contributions to climate change; differing likely impacts of climate change, with certain poorer countries 
being more vulnerable than many others; and different capacities to contribute to global mitigation and 
national adaptation efforts.41 The premise of such is that leadership from developed countries in climate 
action and differential treatment of developing countries is the equitable and appropriate basis for the 
structure of the international response to climate change.42 As a result, “the UNFCCC incorporates the 
CBDR as a principle that underlies the legal regime.”43   
The UNFCCC created this differentiation through the Annex based categorization, where 
developed countries were named in a list, enclosed in its Annex I. These Annex I countries were 
required to take leadership by committing to provide financial resources and promoting, facilitating and 
financing the transfer of technology to developing countries.44 In addition, the Annex I parties were 
subject to an obligation to “aim” as a group (“individually or jointly”) to return their emissions to 1990 
levels by the year 2000. This collective aim was duly met with the collective emissions of the Annex I 
parties were more than 6% below their 1990 levels by 2000.45 The UNFCCC also set up reporting 
obligations (similarly differentiated) and initiated the annual sessions of the COP, setting in motion a 
continuous negotiation process to build upon the framework of the UNFCCC to progressively develop 
the international climate regime.46 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40 Atapattu and Schapper (n3), 206 
41 McInernay-Lankford, Darrow and Rajamani. “Human Rights and Climate Change: A Review of the 
International Legal Dimensions” (2011), World Bank Study, 49 
42 Rajamani and Guerin. “Central Concepts in the Paris Agreement and How they Evolved” in Klein et al. (eds) 
“The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary” (2017), Ch. 4, 81 
43 Atapattu and Schapper (n3), 206 
44 Depledge (n38), 29 
45 Ibid, 30. 
46 Ibid, 30-32. 
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The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in December 1997 and brought forth binding obligations and quantified 
emission targets for Annex I parties.47 A compliance mechanism was defined to back up the 
commitments.48 It broke new ground by introducing market mechanisms as central instruments for 
implementation, setting up schemes for international emissions trading and engaged non-Annex I 
parties on a voluntary basis through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),49 although there have 
been various human rights issues regarding project implementation through the CDM as will be 
discussed later. The emissions trading scheme also turned “carbon into a commodity” which has 
created its own problems.50 The Kyoto Protocol required the Annex I parties to reduce their overall 
emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period of 2008-2012.51 At COP 18 in 
2012, the Doha Amendment was adopted which increased the reduction target to 18% from the group 
from 1990 levels in the 2013-2020 commitment period, however the coverage of Doha was less than 
that of Kyoto as several Annex I parties declined to take on the second commitment period.52 
However, while the Kyoto Protocol outlined the grave nature of the threat and set up multiple 
mechanisms to work toward climate mitigation, the goals enshrined under Kyoto were insufficient to 
address the problem. The modest emission targets set in Kyoto were “grossly insufficient” and “some 
scholars even argue that they set back the solution process by decades”.53 Overall, the Kyoto Protocol 
has been ineffective in reducing the increased concentration of atmospheric GHG.54 That being said, 
Kyoto remains an important manifestation of developed country leadership and it is unlikely that the 
strengthening of commitments in the Paris Agreement would have got underway without it.55 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Ibid, 33 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid, 33-34 
50 Scott and Smith. “Sacrifice Zones in the Green Energy Economy: The New Climate Refugees” (2017). 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 26(2), 374-375 
51 McInernay-Lankford et al. (n41), 50 
52 Depledge (n38), 34. 
53 Ivanova (n27), 20 
54 Boyle. “Climate Change, The Paris Agreement and Human Rights” (2018). International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 67(4), 760. 
55 Depledge (n38), 35 
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The Paris Agreement 
The adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 was hailed as a breakthrough and it renewed optimism 
around international climate action. It set out a new agenda for implementing climate action and 
sustainable development post-Kyoto. One of its most significant features lies in its intended objective - 
to hold global temperature increases to ‘well below’ 2 °C and if possible, below 1.5 °C.56 It achieves this 
objective principally by committing all States parties to “prepare, communicate and maintain” 
successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.57 These 
NDCs are basically individual parties’ climate action plans and although they are not formally part of the 
treaty beyond references to them, they are housed by the UNFCCC Secretariat.58 Even though the 
NDCs are voluntary, certain binding obligations flow from them as Paris is a hybrid document 
encompassing both voluntary commitments and binding obligations.59 The NDCs can be changed 
unilaterally by the State party at any time but this is subject to some conditions, namely that adjustments 
should enhance the level of ambition and developed countries are expected to maintain economy-
wide absolute emission reductions while developing countries are expected to move toward economy-
wide reduction targets over time.60  
The Kyoto approach was largely a failure, especially by the time it came around to the second 
commitment period. Many developed countries backed out and removed themselves from the Kyoto 
process. At the same time, many developing countries exempt from Kyoto targets grew significantly, 
accompanied by a growth in their GHG emissions. The Paris outcome took a different approach, based 
on the idea that voluntary commitments are more likely to be met than those imposed through collective 
negotiations by the global community.61 In addition, the Annex-based differentiation had always been a 
point of contestation and could be considered outdated. Developed states must still take the lead, but 
developing states are no longer exempt from making any emissions reductions, as they were under 
Kyoto. Although exemption may have been an understandable policy choice in the 1990s, by 2012 
                                                          
56 Paris Agreement (2015), Art 2.1(a) 
57 Boyle (n54), 763 
58 Bodle and Oberthür. “Legal Form of the Paris Agreement and Nature of its Obligations” in Klein et al. (eds). 
“The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary” (2017), Ch.5, 93 
59 Atapattu and Schapper (n3), 216 
60 Bodle and Oberthür (n58), 94 
61 Doelle. “Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses” in Klein et al. (eds). “The Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change: Analysis and Commentary” (2017), Ch.22, 376 
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China was the world’s biggest GHG emitter and India the third.62 To tackle climate change, these 
countries had to be brought into the emission reduction regime. 
Paris thus had to take steps to refine CBDR. It established certain core obligations for all parties 
in action “toward the purpose, on mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and transparency”.63 
Under Paris, all parties are expected to ‘prepare’ some level of contribution to ensuring that greenhouse 
gas emissions peak as soon as possible and thereafter reduce rapidly. The understanding is that 
reductions are to increase progressively, insofar as national circumstances allow, based on equity, and 
in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.64 The Agreement also 
recognises the special circumstances of SIDS and LDCs in the context of NDCs, financial support and 
capacity building.65 
While a detailed analysis of the obligations of the Paris Agreement cannot be fit into this paper, 
it is worth looking at what it says on the topic of mitigation closely. Later chapters will also address its 
integration (or lack thereof, according to some) of human rights and energy. The provisions on 
mitigation, in Article 4 of the Agreement, opens with the long-term goal for mitigation which is the 
peaking of emissions “as soon as possible”, and to take rapid reductions thereafter with “best available 
science”, recognising peaking would take longer for developing countries and framing the goal with 
several key principles including “equity”, “sustainable development” and the “eradication of poverty”.66 
The mitigation NDCs are differentiated “in light of different national circumstances” but there is a legal 
expectation that they must reflect the country’s highest possible ambition. They must also be submitted 
every five years, making mandatory informational requirements to track progress in implementing and 
achieving NDCs.67 Article 4.2 not only creates the mandatory obligation to prepare and communicate 
NDCs but also obliges states to pursue domestic mitigation measures to achieve the objectives of their 
NDCs. Article 4.3 demands that each successive NDC submitted by a state party should “represent a 
progression beyond” the previous.68 Progression is an important facet of the climate response as noted 
by its presence throughout the Paris framework. Art 4.4 which differentiates mitigation for developed 
                                                          
62 Boyle (n54), 764 
63 Bodle and Oberthür (n58), 97 
64 Boyle (n54), 764 
65 Bodle and Oberthür (n58), 97 
66 Paris Agreement (2015), Art 4.1 
67 Winkler. “Mitigation (Article 4)” in Klein et al. (eds). “The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and 
Commentary” (2017), Ch.9, 141 
68 Paris Agreement (2015), Art 4.2, 4.3 
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and developing states (economy-wide reductions vs enhancing mitigation with view to move toward 
economy-wide reductions), also foresees a progression in the mitigation obligations of developing 
states.69 However this progression may depend on the level of support received by developing 
countries, thus requiring a progression in finance flows.70 While Article 4.5 says that “support shall be 
provided” to developing countries for the implementation of Article 4, “in accordance with Articles 9, 10 
and 11” on finance, technology and capacity building. While these latter articles specify developed 
country support,71 Article 4 leaves this open – but regardless, as it must be read in accordance with the 
later articles, it implies developed country support. Developed country support need not only be the 
transfer through public channels, but would also require leveraging non-state actors, ensuring 
participation of non-party stakeholders as well as engaging private finance and international financial 
institutions to align their financial flows with the objectives of the Agreement.72 
Even if the 2015 Paris Agreement as it currently stands is fully implemented by all parties, it 
may be difficult to keep the increase in global temperatures below 2 °C, let alone achieve the target of 
1.5 °C.73 The sum of the NDCs will leave an emissions gap, and as a result, the strength of review and 
compliance as well as motivation of state parties’ to progressively increase their commitments and 
display ambition will be critical in determining the adequacy of the Agreement.74 The failure of the Paris 
Agreement would have catastrophic consequences for human rights.  
 
Normative Content of Relevant Human Rights 
As has been stressed previously, climate change is and will affect a variety of human rights. These can 
be direct and indirect effects. The international human rights regime is significantly more developed 
than the climate regime but there has been limited overlap between the two. This section explains the 
normative content of a few relevant human rights and human rights law concepts and principles, as well 
as briefly discussing certain procedural guarantees in place to protect from and remedy human rights 
violations. For the purposes of this paper we will look specifically at the Right to Health, the Right to the 
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Benefits of Scientific Progress, the Right to Housing, the Right to Work, and the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.  
Before we continue onto the substance of these individual rights, there are two concepts that 
must be clearly defined. The first is the matter of Core Minimum Obligations. The wording of Article 2 
of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides for states to 
“take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic 
and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights”.75 This seemingly provides state parties with a degree of flexibility, contrasting 
with the language in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) where parties must “respect 
and ensure” the rights recognised in that treaty.76 This however does not liberate states from 
responsibility. According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), while 
the treaty provides for progressive realization and acknowledges constraints due to limited resources, 
“it also imposes various obligations which are of immediate effect.”77 Furthermore, while the rights may 
be realized progressively, “steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after 
the Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned.”78 Within the same general comment, the 
CESCR put forward the concept of a core minimum obligation “to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party.”79 This means 
that if a state is not offering a minimum level of primary healthcare or education, for example, they can 
be found in violation of their human rights obligations. In a climate related example, a state does not 
necessarily violate its ICESCR obligations by failing to prevent water pollution, if, however, “the failure 
results in the infringement of "minimum essential levels" of the right to water, the state has violated a 
core obligation, and the state may not justify its non-compliance by claiming a lack of sufficient 
resources.”80 
To meet these minimum core obligations, states are obliged to use all available resources. This 
includes international assistance and cooperation in undertaking steps to realize the full enjoyment 
of human rights. The CESCR noted that the phrase “to the maximum of its available resources” was 
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intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources existing within a State and those 
available from the international community through international cooperation and assistance and the 
role of cooperation in facilitating the fulfilment of the rights are acknowledged in several articles within 
the treaty.81 As a result, states have a duty to reach out for international cooperation and assistance. 
Similarly, according to the UN Charter, States have an obligation to “take joint and separate action in 
co-operation” in promoting the “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights”.82 “One possible 
interpretation is that, while the primary responsibility for meeting the obligations under the ICESCR 
remains on the State with jurisdiction over the people concerned, States in a position to assist other 
States to meet those obligations are required to do so.”83 When applied to climate change, the 
implication of this interpretation is that the requirement to assist other States requires richer countries 
to help poorer States pay the costs of climate action to protect human rights from violation.84 
 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
The Right to Health is contained in Article 12 of the ICESCR.85 It is widely recognised, considered a 
prerequisite to the fulfilment of various other human rights and extends to the underlying determinants 
of health such as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, 
safe and healthy working conditions, and a healthy environment.86 It is not a right to be healthy, as 
CESCR points out, but rather “must be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, 
goods, services and conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of 
health.”87 It is judged via the AAAQ framework, namely on Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and 
Quality.88  
There are several relevant facets of the interpretation of the right to health by the CESCR in 
relation to climate change. The obligation to fulfil the right to health involves protecting and/or reducing 
environmental health hazards. The CESCR specifically mentions that states should “formulate and 
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implement national policies aimed at reducing and eliminating pollution of air, water and soil, including 
pollution by heavy metals such as lead from gasoline.”89 Internationally the CESCR prescribes, 
“depending on the availability of resources, States should facilitate access to essential health facilities, 
goods and services in other countries, wherever possible, and provide the necessary aid when required” 
and that states should offer assistance and cooperation in providing humanitarian or disaster relief.90 
Article 12 requires States to cooperate and assist one another to achieve the full realization of the right 
to health. “As the Alma-Ata Declaration proclaimed, “the gross inequality in the health status of the 
people, particularly between developed and developing countries, as well as within countries, is 
politically, socially and economically unacceptable and is, therefore, of common concern to all 
countries.”91  
 
The Right to Housing 
The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living is found in Article 11 of the ICESCR and the right to 
adequate housing derives from it.92 The CESCR has urged parties to not take a basic definition of what 
housing refers to but rather “it should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security, peace and 
dignity.”93 There are several key aspects that States should take into account to achieve the right to 
housing: legal security of tenure, availability  of  services,  materials,  facilities  and  infrastructure, 
affordability, habitability, accessibility, location and cultural adequacy.94 States parties must also give 
priority to those social groups living in unfavourable conditions by giving them particular consideration.95 
With the considerable threat of forced displacement from rising sea levels and increased natural 
disasters, the right to housing comes under considerable duress from climate change. A 2009 OHCHR 
report prescribes several human rights guarantees in the context of climate change including: adequate 
protection of housing from weather hazards, access to housing away from hazardous zones, access to 
shelter and disaster preparedness in cases of displacement caused by extreme weather events and 
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protection of communities that are relocated away from hazardous zones, including protection against 
forced evictions”.96 
 
The Right to Work 
The right to work can be found in Article 6 of the ICESCR.97 As the CESCR states, the right to work 
should not be understood as an absolute and unconditional right to obtain employment but rather the 
right of every human being to decide freely to accept or choose work.98 Article 6.2 provides a non-
exhaustive list of obligations on states to ensure the right to work, including “technical and vocational 
guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and 
cultural development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental 
political and economic freedoms to the individual.”99 The CESCR outlines a similar AAAQ framework 
for the achievement of this right.100 Specific legal obligations arising from this right include duties to 
prohibit forced or compulsory labour and refraining from denying or limiting equal access to decent work 
for all persons.101 It also requires states he duties to adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring 
equal access to work and training and to ensure flexibility in the labour market, but not at the cost of job 
security.102 The obligation to fulfil the right to work requires parties to take positive measures to enable 
and assist individuals to enjoy the right to work and to implement technical and vocational education 
plans to facilitate access to employment.103 Climate change and the sustainable energy transition will 
fundamentally reshape our societies as the fabric of our economy is dependent upon the plentiful and 
relatively inexpensive supply of fossil fuels.104 With the required transition away from fossil fuels, many 
jobs and livelihoods will be at risk, and as things are in a connected economy, this will have massive 
ripple effects. The obligations to protect the right to work will be key toward ensuring a just transition. 
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The Right to the Benefits of Scientific Progress 
A lesser known right, it is found in Article 15.1(b) of the ICESCR.105 It is usually regarded as a means 
to advance the realization of other human rights and to address “the needs common to all humanity”.106 
The Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights says the normative content of the right to benefit from 
scientific progress includes access to the benefits of science by everyone, without discrimination; 
opportunities for all to contribute to the scientific enterprise and freedom indispensable for scientific 
research; participation of individuals and communities in decision-making; and an enabling environment 
fostering the conservation, development and diffusion of science and technology.107 The free diffusion 
of science seems to contradict intellectual property rights, and the Special Rapporteur recognises the 
potential of intellectual property regimes to obstruct new technological solutions to critical problems 
such as food, energy and climate change.108  
There is a need to strengthen international cooperation in the area of science, develop the 
scientific and technological capacity of developing countries, ensure the international dissemination of 
scientific knowledge and research, particularly among industrialized and developing countries, and call 
for transfers of technologies, practices and procedures.109 For developing countries, this right also 
obliges the development and dissemination of inexpensive technology to improve the lives of 
marginalized communities.110 This last point in particular has special consequences for sustainable 
energy transitions in encouraging states to pursue cheaper, decentralized energy for marginalized, rural 
areas to improve energy access rather than pursuing costlier central grid expansions that may not make 
as much economic sense in those areas for return on investment.  
 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
While there is no mention of indigenous peoples’ specifically in the core human rights treaties, it can 
find some expression in Article 27 of the ICCPR, which applies to minorities and dictates that minorities 
“shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
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culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”111 While this is not 
specific to indigenous peoples’, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) acknowledges that to enjoy a 
particular culture may consist in a way of life which is closely associated with territory/land and use of 
its resources which is particularly true for indigenous people who have a close connection to their 
land.112 This also extends to traditional activities such as fishing or hunting and the right to live in 
reserves protected by law and the enjoyment of these rights require positive legal measures of 
protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members the community in decision 
making.113  
The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) in 2007. Even though it is not legally binding, it is a landmark document to outline the ways 
in which human rights must be interpreted for the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. A key 
concept within this framework is free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). The UNDRIP prescribes 
that indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect 
their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves, as well as to maintain and develop their 
own indigenous decision-making institutions. Furthermore, States must consult and cooperate with the 
indigenous peoples concerned to obtain their FPIC before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.114 FPIC is a binding legal standard through ILO 
Convention 169 which reiterates the requirement of states to consult and obtain the consent of 
indigenous peoples’ for any legislative or administrative measures that may affect them. It also forbids 
the forced relocation of indigenous peoples’ unless in exceptional circumstances, and even then, only 
with their FPIC.115 Much of the human rights concerns of climate change will have special impacts on 
indigenous peoples and as will be discussed in later chapters, the mitigation measures and moves 
toward renewable energy have also led to violations of the rights of indigenous peoples.  
With a better understanding of the normative content of relevant rights as well as that of the 
international climate regime, it is now worth looking at the ongoing interactions and synergies between 
the two.  
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Chapter 3: The Nexus Between Climate Action and Human Rights 
 
While the international climate regime and the international human rights regime are separate, there 
are obvious and clear connections between their goals and a greater level of synergy is required in 
achieving such. However, this interaction between the two regimes is more recent phenomenon and 
there is still much room for development. The lateness of the human rights regime in picking up the 
importance of climate change should not now prevent it from engaging closely with the climate 
framework. The human rights community was slow to recognise the link between climate change and 
the protection of fundamental rights but now looking at the list of adverse consequences, it is easy to 
see that most protected rights could be undermined by climate change. “Once the link between climate 
change and human rights became obvious and communities started experiencing the adverse impacts, 
the human rights community started lobbying to get a human rights provision included in climate 
documents.”116 This chapter analyses the results of this lobbying, the increasing cooperation between 
the two and possible avenues of reinforcement and development. 
 
Ongoing Synergies Between Human Rights and Climate Action 
The Male Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, adopted by representatives 
of SIDS in November 2007 was the first intergovernmental statement explicitly recognising that climate 
change has “clear and immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human rights”, including the 
rights to an adequate standard of living and to the highest attainable standard of health and requested 
the Human Rights Council to convene a debate on human rights and climate change; OHCHR to study 
the effects of climate change on the full enjoyment of human rights, and the COP to seek the 
cooperation of OHCHR and the Council in assessing the human rights implications of climate change.117 
In 2008, the Human Rights Council adopted its first resolution on climate change and human rights. In 
resolution 7/23, the Council expressed its concern that climate change poses an immediate and far-
reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment 
of human rights.118  
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In a 2009 OHCHR Report, the threat of climate change to the enjoyment of various human 
rights were reiterated, and it drew a series of interesting conclusions. It identified that the effects on 
human rights can be of a direct nature, such as the threat extreme weather events may pose to the 
right to life, but often it has an indirect and gradual effect on human rights, such as increasing stress on 
health systems and vulnerabilities related to climate change-induced migration.119 The report mentioned 
the contraction of snow-covered areas, sea level rise and higher thermal temperatures, increases in 
extreme weather events and increases in tropical cyclones as some of the main consequences of 
climate change. In addition to this it also spoke of more localized impacts such as health effects, impacts 
on food and water availability and supply, changes in cultivation patterns, and pests, among other 
issues that would impact millions of people’s lives.120  
It also identified how climate change may exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, especially among 
the most vulnerable groups of society.121 The most important takeaway from this report however, was 
that “the physical impacts of global warming cannot easily be classified as human rights violations, not 
least because climate change-related harm often cannot clearly be attributed to acts or omissions of 
specific States.”122 It did stress though that addressing that harm remains a critical human rights concern 
and obligation under international law and that legal protection remains relevant as a safeguard against 
climate change-related risks and infringements of human rights resulting from policies and measures 
taken at the national level to address climate change.123 In other words “the report did not conclude that 
climate change necessarily violates human rights law, but it stressed that States nevertheless have 
obligations to take steps to protect human rights from the harmful effects of climate change.”124 This 
distinction relates to the problem of pinpointing causality between the effects of climate change and 
GHG emissions that caused climate change and will be discussed in greater detail later.  
 2009 marked the year for escalating human rights lobbying of the climate regime. Before 
COP15 in Copenhagen, 20 special procedure mandate holders issued a joint statement “emphasizing 
that climate change poses serious threats to the full enjoyment of a broad range of human rights, 
warning that a weak outcome of the negotiations would threaten to infringe upon those rights and stating 
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that mitigation and adaptation measures should be developed in accordance with human rights norms, 
including with the participation of affected communities.”125 The next year, at COP16 in Cancun, the 
parties’ adopted a decision which included the line “Parties should, in all climate change related actions, 
fully respect human rights”.126 In 2012, the Human Rights Council decided to establish a mandate on 
human rights and the environment, first creating the post as an Independent Expert and later as a 
Special Rapporteur.  
 According to the former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, “the 
attention to climate change and human rights reached a crescendo” at COP21 in Paris.127 The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights made a powerful statement that urgent, effective and 
ambitious action to combat climate change is not only a moral imperative, but also necessary in order 
to satisfy the duties of States under human rights law while the Special Rapporteur on human rights 
and the environment also reminded States that their human rights obligations encompass climate 
change and urged them to adopt a rights perspective in negotiating the new agreement.128 The result 
was the inclusion of human rights in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, urging States to respect, 
promote and consider their human rights obligations when taking action to address climate change.129  
The Paris Agreement is the first climate agreement to explicitly recognise the relevance of 
human rights.130 The Special Rapporteur considers this a “real achievement” worth celebrating and 
continues that “the Paris Agreement signifies the recognition by the international community that climate 
change poses unacceptable threats to the full enjoyment of human rights and that actions to address 
climate change must comply with human rights obligations.”131 The inclusion of human rights in the 
preamble is certainly a landmark but it represents a starting point in the nexus, rather than an end goal.  
The mention of human rights in the Paris Agreement gives no binding obligations, but the use 
of the word “should” is indicative of a “soft” obligation to integrate norms or principles of international 
human rights law. It is worded in a way to also encourage the prevention of impairment of human rights 
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through mitigation and adaptation projects as have arisen in the past.132 Another important facet of the 
wording is in the provision to “respect, promote and consider” human rights obligations, which excludes 
the traditionally accepted duties of “protect and fulfil” as it was considered too operative for a preambular 
paragraph.133 While not creating new obligations for parties, this provision does point parties to the need 
to harmonize climate action with human rights.134 
But is this enough? Some scholars would argue no. Boyle levels various criticisms toward the 
way human rights is integrated via the Paris Agreement. He quotes Rajamani in saying, ‘This recital 
carefully circumscribes the impact of an explicit reference to human rights in the Paris Agreement. 
Human rights law is neither incorporated into the Paris Agreement by this wording, nor does it explicitly 
constitute a standard by which the adequacy of efforts taken by the parties to implement the objectives 
of the Paris Agreement might be judged”.135 Its inclusion in the preamble does not constitute any 
obligations but rather serves to guide interpretation and the word “should” rather than “shall” implies a 
“less than wholehearted endorsement of the relevance of the various rights referred to”.136 The 
exclusion of the words “protect and fulfil” minimizes the commitment of the Agreement toward human 
rights and at best serves as a mere recognition that parties should take into account human rights 
obligations in their actions to address climate change, falling quite short of a “true incorporation” of 
human rights into the climate regime. Furthermore, he takes issue with the specific catalogue of rights 
and groups mentioned in the paragraph, arguing that the inclusion of some rights over others and some 
groups over others “looks more like a list of categories designed to satisfy special interest groups rather 
than a serious attempt to address the relationship between human rights law and climate change”.137  
Much of this can be attributed to the very nature of international human rights law, where dealing 
with violations is often reactive rather than proactive. As the OHCHR recognised a decade ago, it is 
unclear whether climate change actually violates human rights law, owing to the difficulty in identifying 
responsibility for historic GHG emissions. A second problem is the transboundary nature of climate 
change – as causality is virtually impossible to prove up to the standards required by human rights law 
                                                          
132 Carazo. “Contextual Provisions (Preamble and Article 1) in Klein et al. (eds) “The Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary” (2017), Ch. 6, 114-115 
133 Ibid, 115 
134 Carazo and Klein. “Implications for Public International Law: Initial Considerations” in Klein et al. (eds) “The 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary” (2017), Ch. 23, 401 
135 Boyle (n54), 769 
136 Ibid, 769-770 
137 Ibid. 
27 
 
to invoke extraterritorial obligations, it is nearly impossible to hold emitting states accountable for human 
rights violations in frontline states. The next section explores this in greater detail, while also discussing 
potential solutions in how human rights may be used to reinforce climate action obligations.  
 
Reinforcing Obligations 
As identified in the previous section, one of the primary barriers to claiming human rights violations as 
a result of climate change arises from the transboundary nature of climate change and the difficulty in 
pinpointing causality, making it nearly impossible to assign responsibility – especially to the historically 
high-emissions states. Human rights obligations towards those most affected by climate change will at 
the very least require governments to take appropriate steps to mitigate the risk of harm within their 
own borders the key question is not whether GHG emitting States have to mitigate the harm to their 
own citizens, but whether they also have a responsibility to protect people in other States from the 
harmful impacts of those emissions on the global climate.138 The standards for invoking extraterritorial 
obligations are quite stringent, with effective control being the usual test to determine whether a state 
has jurisdiction outside its borders but this standard seems impossible to prove in the case of the 
adverse effects of climate change. As Knox says, “If aerial bombardment does not give states effective 
control of the places affected, it seems unlikely that such control would result from the less immediate 
and drastic measure of allowing GHG to cross international borders.”139  
There are several other barriers to pursuing international litigation for climate damages, 
especially those occurring extraterritorially. In Gromilova’s article regarding the situation of Tuvalu, a 
small low-lying Pacific island state that may be entirely submerged due to rising sea levels, she outlines 
several of the issues with Tuvalu claiming damages by high-emitting states. These include: a) 
recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICJ which the US, the historically largest GHG emitter, does not 
recognise; b) the prohibitive cost of pursuing litigation for LDCs; and c) the threat of political backlash 
by developed states.140 Even though it is an accepted custom that no state shall cause harm to another, 
to establish a breach of this rule, Tuvalu will have to show that there is: a) a wrongful act attributable to 
the State; b) a causal link between the activity and damage; c) a violation of either international law or 
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a violation of a duty of care, which is d) owed to the damaged State.141 To establish these criteria is 
near impossible under contemporary international law. Scientifically speaking, it is difficult to prove that 
the injury was caused by climate change, provoked by the behaviour of any particular state (the effects 
felt by Tuvalu from climate change have been diffused through the GHG contributions of many states), 
rather than “purely natural events”, leaving alone the spatial and temporal distance which hamper the 
establishment of causality. Furthermore, most of the damages that Tuvalu will experience have not 
actually happened yet and arguments of intergenerational equity and precautionary principle are still 
emerging in international law and not fully developed.142 Extraterritorial obligations are a controversial 
topic, and there is still no legally binding document that elaborates on the content of the topic – only 
soft law.143 Given the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, and the “essentially voluntary” character of key 
provisions of the Paris Agreement, it is far from clear that inadequately controlled climate change 
violates any existing treaty obligations or general international law and the argument that policy which 
complies with the climate regime on emissions reductions nevertheless violates human rights 
obligations is not easy to make.144  
But perhaps the focus on duty-bearers and responsibility is misplaced. It would be more fruitful 
to look at positive obligations rather than responsibility for wrongful acts, and how human rights law can 
help spur climate action efforts rather than punishing historic emissions.  Quoting the Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, Boyle argues that obligations to protect human 
rights in the context of internal environmental harm ‘can also inform the content of the duty of 
international cooperation when that duty pertains to a global environmental challenge such as climate 
change’. On this view of human rights law ‘All states have a duty to work together to address climate 
change, but the particular responsibilities necessary and appropriate for each State will depend in part 
upon its situation.”145 What does this mean? In the absence of tangible extraterritorial obligations, states 
do still have the obligation to protect their own jurisdiction from climate change by pursuing mitigation 
and adaptation measures. This is still somewhat problematic however, as very few states contribute 
enough to the global GHG emissions that reductions in individual emissions would make a significant 
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impact – especially when accounting for growth in emissions elsewhere.146 This does not preclude the 
obligation to take adaptation measures, nor the obligation to seek assistance for those measures.147 
Neither does it restrict the obligation for states to hold private actors accountable in the implementation 
of climate action measures within its jurisdiction. 
States do also have a duty to try and influence the international community to reduce GHG 
emissions says Knox. “This duty may be derived from the duty to request assistance, but it is also akin 
to states' obligations to regulate private sources within their control.”148 States do not have control over 
one another, but they also don’t have complete control over private actors, but human rights law still 
requires states to make best efforts and undertake due diligence to protect rights from interference from 
other actors, including other states. As a result, states have a duty to influence the international 
community to reduce emissions through persuasion or bargaining, or more practically, this obligation 
may require states to seek an effective international agreement to reduce GHG emissions to levels that 
protect its own people from the adverse effects of climate change. “In that context, its duties to its own 
people may obligate it to commit to reductions in its own emissions, as part of its effort to obtain such a 
global agreement.”149  
Positive obligations for states in terms of precautionary action to prevent environmental hazards 
are well established in human rights jurisprudence. In Budayeva and Others v Russia, regarding a 
mudslide in the town of Tyrnauz in the central Caucasus, the European Court of Human Rights stressed 
a State’s responsibility to undertake preventative measures to reduce the risk of disasters occurring.150 
The court found that Russia ignored warnings that dangerous mudslides might occur, did not institute 
an early-warning system to allow people to evacuate in time and did not allocate funds for the repair of 
protective dams – concluding that Russia failed to establish the legal framework necessary to deter 
threats and thereby violated substantive human rights obligations.151 Thus the question of whether 
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climate change is a violation of human rights law is less relevant, as states have obligations to protect 
human rights from the effects of climate change regardless.152  
The human rights regime also includes several procedural guarantees and mechanisms that 
can strengthen commitments to climate action. Firstly, UN human rights bodies could use their existing 
oversight powers to focus attention on how States parties respond to their climate commitments. The 
CESCR has begun to address the failure of some States to reduce GHG emissions, preserve carbon 
sinks, and promote renewable energy, and has also taken the view that the UNFCCC and Paris 
Agreement are relevant to interpreting the ICESCR.153 The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) could 
provide another avenue for monitoring compliance. In addition to assessing compliance with human 
rights obligations, the UPR permits the Human Rights Council to monitor compliance with voluntary 
pledges and commitments made by States; it would make sense for the pledges under the Paris 
Agreement to fall within this category given the potential impact of climate change on human rights.154 
Furthermore, considering the wide range of potential human rights violations arising from disasters, it 
would be appropriate for a State’s actions pre- and post-disasters to be examined as part of the UPR 
process.155 
There are also several procedural obligations of states key to protecting human rights violations 
from environmental harm. These include duties: (a) to assess environmental impacts and make 
environmental information public; (b) to facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making, 
including by protecting the rights of expression and association; and (c) to provide access to remedies 
for harm.156 Participation is particularly vital. Article 6(a) of the UNFCCC encourages States to promote 
and facilitate “public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing adequate 
responses” and is also reiterated in the Paris Agreement.157 These requirements on participation apply 
not only to decisions about how much climate protection to pursue, but also to the measures through 
which the protection is achieved and decisions on mitigation or adaptation projects must be made with 
the informed participation of the people who would be affected by the projects.158 States should also 
ensure that international climate financing mechanisms also respect and protect human rights, 
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especially as certain mechanisms, like the CDM have been criticised in the past for not facilitating 
enough stakeholder participation.159 
The Right to Remedy is the last mentioned by the Rapporteur and he once again acknowledges 
the difficulties of determining where contributions to climate change constitute human rights violations 
although he reiterates that finding a violation is not a prerequisite for addressing damage to those 
affected by and vulnerable to climate change.160 Climate litigation is an expanding area but has seen 
breakthroughs in domestic scenarios. “Litigious action in human rights for the climate change 
consequences of emissions policy has recently met with relative success, and recent case law has 
contradicted the idea that liability can be universally avoided simply because of an inability to show 
direct causation by a single state.”161 The District Court of The Hague found in Urgenda Foundation v 
State of the Netherlands that ‘a sufficient causal link can be assumed to exist between the Dutch GHG 
emissions, global climate change, and the effects … on the Dutch living climate’ and found that Dutch 
emissions reduction targets were below the standard deemed necessary by climate science as set out 
in international agreements to which the Netherlands was a party. In order to prevent dangerous climate 
change, GHG emissions must be reduced by 25–40 per cent by 2020 based on 1990 levels and the 
Court ordered that the Government limit Dutch GHG emissions to 25 per cent by 2020.162 As a result, 
mitigation policy is indeed justiciable.  
This chapter discussed the various ways human rights law interacts with climate change and 
the principles and obligations that can strengthen climate action commitments, especially in terms of 
mitigation policy and the reduction of GHG emissions. The next chapter talks about Sustainable Energy 
Transitions, a key strategy in mitigation action. The energy transition from fossil fuels to renewables is 
accelerating in many countries, spurred by environmental obligations but what are the human rights 
dimensions of this? How does human rights law reinforce the idea of a just energy transition? How can 
the energy transition help protect human rights? And lastly, how can the energy transition be carried 
out in a way that respects and protects human rights?  
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Chapter 4: The Sustainable Energy Transition and Human Rights 
 
One of the key strategies for mitigation action is the increased use and accelerated transition to 
renewable energy. A move away from fossil fuels would cut the biggest contributor to GHG emissions 
globally. The goals laid out in the Paris Agreement cannot be achieved without a significant increase of 
renewable energies and energy efficiency, and a reduction of fossil fuel production, consumption and 
related subsidies.163 This is a monumental task that requires a fundamental shift in a global economy 
that is still largely carbon-based. But a shift is emerging. The Paris process was an important driver, 
and catalysed “unprecedented commitments for low-carbon investment to accelerate the transition to a 
cleaner energy economy” and over 400 investors representing more than USD 24 trillion in assets 
committed to increasing low carbon and climate resilient investments.164 For all intents and purposes, 
this is a transition that is already underway.  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has projected an increase in the share of renewables 
in the global electricity generation mix from over 23% in 2015 to almost 28% in 2021 and investments 
in onshore wind and solar are progressing toward the global goal of limiting temperature rise to 2°C.165 
This is aided by the falling costs of renewables. According to the World Economic Forum, in 2006, solar 
costs would be around USD 600/MWh, much above the widely-used coal and natural gas sources at 
USD 100/MWh. However, solar costs were halved five years later, and compressed again to around 
USD 100/MWh by 2016 while wind costs are around USD 50/MWh.166 But a sustainable energy 
transition is a lot more than switching the fuels used for our energy needs, although that is a major 
aspect. It also includes innovating new distribution and delivery systems, increasing efficiency, 
changing behaviours, shifts in policy. It would not be an exaggeration to say it involves a fundamental 
change in the way society is structured. This chapter discusses the energy transition in greater detail, 
while also outlining its relationship with human rights, both in how it can help protect them from a 
changing climate reality but also how we must consider human rights in order to ensure a just energy 
transition that respects and protects human rights.  
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What is the Sustainable Energy Transition? 
Energy systems are among the largest human enterprises, comprising 9 of the 12 most heavily 
capitalized companies in the world. They form the heart of the technological arrangements around which 
contemporary industrial economies are organized. Efforts to transform energy systems involve 
changes, therefore, not only to energy technologies and prices but also to the broader social and 
economic assemblages that are built around energy production and consumption.167 Currently, the bulk 
of the global energy portfolio is based on fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas, etc) but the consensus 
around the dangers posed by climate change has given rise to a transition away from carbon-heavy 
fuels toward renewable energy that has far less GHG emissions. Energy production and consumption 
make up the bulk of GHG emissions, up to 80% in some industrialized countries, which means policies 
must shift toward alternative energy systems. This is a process already underway, with many 
recognising that fossil fuel use, especially oil will peak soon, and the doctrine of sustainable 
development encouraging developing nations where energy use must increase in order to alleviate 
poverty, to adopt more sustainable energy pathways than that which was followed by developed 
states.168  
 The traditional barrier to switching to renewable energy has been cost. The fuels used in 
renewables are everywhere (solar, hydro, wind, etc) but the cost of utilizing such and storing such has 
been prohibitive. But trends over the last few years are encouraging. Since 2008, the global solar 
module price index has fallen by a factor of nearly four, a rate of technical advance that vastly exceeded 
nearly all predictions and declines in the cost of wind power—while not as dramatic—have been rapid 
by any standard.169 “These advances both spur private investment and generally ease the politics of 
supporting clean energy transitions. Investments in energy production have reflected these shifts. In 
2014, for the first time in history, the amount of new renewable generation capacity surpassed that of 
new fossil fuel-based systems on a global basis.” 170 This trend continued the next year and a welcome 
GBP 198 billion was invested worldwide in renewable energy in 2015, marking also the largest annual 
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increase of clean energy implementation. Renewable energy is expected to become the largest source 
in global electricity production by 2030.171  
 Investment and cost reductions aren’t enough however. Energy efficiency has a massive role 
to play as well, some scholars even calling it “the most obvious contributor to sustainable energy” 
highlighting the need for it to be promoted in all sectors of the economy such as transport, buildings, 
industry and consumer goods.172 Research by the IEA shows, that energy efficiency can potentially 
make a greater contribution to stabilising carbon emissions than all the clean energy sources (including 
nuclear energy).  Energy efficiency is perhaps discounted in that it does not generate new energy but 
simply reduces the rate of consumption of existing energy, but one may consider that a unit of energy 
saved is equivalent to a unit of energy generated.173 Comprehensive legislation on energy efficiency is 
a must, or there is a risk, especially in the drive towards developing new energy-generating capacity, 
there will be “profligate squandering of the remaining fossil-fuel resources and unnecessary aggravation 
of atmospheric carbon emissions and other environmental issues.”174 A sustainable energy transition 
must include the wide-scale adoption of energy-efficient technology and investments in measures to 
improve energy efficiency.175  
 Energy transitions must be understood in terms of more than just fuel and technology; as 
transitions in fuels are inevitably accompanied by widespread social, economic, and political 
transformations that must be factored in. The technologies of production and consumption are modular 
and can be flexibly morphed into a diverse range of overarching energy systems; which means the 
question is much greater than the fuel used or even the technologies utilised but rather the policy-level, 
social, economic and political arrangements that define the energy system.176  An important aspect of 
the energy transition comes from how energy is distributed, how these distribution systems are 
designed and how to ensure that distribution systems are just.  
 Distributional justice recognises both the physically unequal allocation of environmental 
benefits and ills, and the uneven distribution of their associated responsibilities, and refers not only to 
the siting of power generation which may have ecological and social impacts but also in the access to 
                                                          
171 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. “Towards Responsible Renewable Energy” (2016). BHRRC 
Briefing Note.  
172 Bradbrook (n17), 514 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid, 515 
175 Steg et al. (n16), 11 
176 Miller et al. (n167), 139 
35 
 
the power generated.177 By 2030, the year for completion of the SDGs where SDG 7 demands the 
ensuring of universal energy access, a billion people will remain without access – 80% of whom will be 
in rural areas.178 To be able to extend energy services to those who are marginalized, Sustainable 
Energy for All (SEforALL) estimates that it will require central grid extension for all new urban 
connections and 30% of rural populations, with the remaining 70% of rural people gaining access 
through decentralized solutions (65% via minigrids, 35% via solar home systems (SHS) and intra-
household or ‘pico-solar’ products).179 Innovative design will be necessary to ensure scalability of 
decentralised energy to meet growing demand, but small-scale solutions will be instrumental as an 
entry-point on a path out of energy poverty. As a result, decentralised energy will play a crucial role 
moving forward, as one aspect of the energy transition. But what are the direct impacts of this transition 
on human rights? The next section will look at the nexus of this energy transition on some substantive 
rights, starting with the right to health.  
 
The Right to Health and Sustainable Energy Transition 
Climate change will affect the health of millions of people, including through increased malnutrition, 
diarrhoeal, cardio-respiratory and infectious diseases, and affect the intensity of many types of 
diseases: vector-borne diseases (such as malaria and dengue fever); water-borne diseases; and 
respiratory diseases (such as asthma).180 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that the 
global health costs of climate change by 2030 will be approximately USD 2-4 billion, and that between 
2030 and 2050, some 250,000 additional annual deaths will occur, largely from heat exposure, 
diarrhoea, malaria and childhood undernutrition.181 The IPCC stresses that without taking mitigation 
measures, adaptation to life and health risks of climate change might not even be possible.182 As climate 
change (and for that matter, pollution) impacts the underlying determinants of health, it can be argued 
that the right to health can be violated through unlawful polluting of air, water and soil through GHG 
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emissions, such as in contravention of emissions limits designed to protect human health.183 The human 
rights obligations to mitigate climate change have been laid out in previous sections, and the same 
would apply toward protecting the right to health, in ensuring that all that can be done to minimize the 
risks of diseases and injury through climate change is done.  
 There are two key aspects of protecting the right to health that can be benefitted through a 
sustainable energy transition, albeit this is not an exhaustive list. It is a widely recognised fact that the 
combustion of fossil fuels results not only in harmful GHG emissions, but also, more locally, air pollution. 
Air pollution kills an astonishing number of people every year and causes massive damage in terms of 
health globally. Estimates vary but up to 52,000 people die in the US alone from small particles from 
GHG emissions each year.184 These figures can be even higher in developing countries with less 
stringent regulation and enforcement. In India, coal-plants implementing the Environment Ministry 
issued emissions standards would save 76,000 premature deaths per year.185 None of this is new 
information. That air pollution is associated with respiratory and cardiopulmonary diseases has been 
common knowledge for decades. Yet the burning of fossil fuels has gone unabated. But the drive toward 
renewables may be providing an avenue out. In China, societal pressures due to increasing air pollution 
has been one key factor pushing the CPC to close coal plants and turn to environmentally friendly power 
production, and this has been accompanied by an increasing institutional and political capacity for clean 
energy policy-making at the central level, causing China to accelerate its cleantech deployment.186 
Switching to renewable energy would drastically improve air pollution, and the savings would be 
substantial. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) data says air pollution externalities range 
between USD 1.8 trillion and USD 6.0 trillion for outdoor air pollution, plus USD 0.8 trillion - 2.1 trillion 
for indoor air pollution. Increasing the rate of adoption of renewables can reduce these costs by up to 
USD 3.07 trillion by 2030.187 
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 Almost half the world’s population cooks food daily using open fires or traditional cookstoves 
that rely on wood, manure, coal, and charcoal for energy.188 The use of biomass fuels often results in 
the exposure to indoor air pollution via emissions of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons; such exposure 
generally leads to illnesses and mortality in many developing countries with almost 2 million deaths per 
year.189 Switching away from these fuels toward cleaner cooking fuels would have a massive impact on 
the health of many rural and poor, especially women and children. 
 The second key impact of the energy transition can be in healthcare delivery, especially using 
decentralised energy systems. Electricity access enhances access to quality essential health care 
services while making health systems more resilient, but this is an area that with severe deficiencies, 
especially in remote rural areas in developing countries. A joint report by the United Nations Foundation 
(UNF) and SEforALL says that a survey of 78 countries found that only 41% of low- and middle-income 
country health care facilities have reliable electricity.190 Access to reliable energy has several tangible 
benefits for healthcare delivery. It is required for the operation of basic amenities, including lighting, 
ventilation, ICT, and life-saving medical devices and can enable expanded operating hours and 
increase capacity for night-time health provision. In health centres, access to reliable electricity is 
essential for ensuring the cold chain to safely preserve and store vaccines, blood, and other critical 
medicines requiring refrigeration, not to mention the powering of essential medical equipment such as 
heart rate monitors.191 One of the main issues with electrifying remote rural areas is the high capital 
costs toward extending a centralized grid, especially considering potential difficult terrain. The 
infrastructural investment very often cannot be recuperated due to low incomes and economic activities 
in these areas (although both would increase with electrification). The dramatic cost reductions and 
technological improvement of solar technology in the past decade has made solar an economically and 
technically viable solution that can be deployed in a fraction of the time it would take the centralized 
grid to arrive.192 While less-clean off-grid solutions may have comparable deployment costs, the benefits 
of using renewables are in a) less scope of harmful particulate pollution in the localized setting and b) 
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savings on fuel.193 As a result, transitioning away from current energy practices toward cleaner 
practices, that incorporate localized design needs and the benefits of decentralized energy in providing 
healthcare in places without central grid access, can help boost the availability and accessibility of 
quality healthcare for marginalised populations. A more general shift away from fossil fuel combustion 
will help prevent particulate air pollution resulting in a boost of net welfare and improving the underlying 
determinants of health. 
 
The Energy Transition and the Right to Housing 
There are several key aspects of the normative content of the right to housing that can be benefitted or 
protected by a sustainable energy transition. The most obvious link is that climate mitigation is 
necessary to reduce the considerable threat of displacement and violations of the right to adequate 
housing from climate change and transitioning to renewable energy is one of the primary strategies for 
mitigation. But beyond that, there are several benefits for the protection of the right to housing.  
The first comes from achieving the right by ensuring, among other things, the availability of 
basic services. Here again, energy access plays a key role, and this can be benefitted from adopting 
decentralized or off-grid energy. As stated by the WEHAB Working Group, “Although energy itself is not 
a basic human need, it is critical for the fulfilment of all needs. Lack of access to diverse and affordable 
energy services means that the basic needs of many people are not being met.”194 Access to energy 
has also been recognised as being linked to the right to housing by the South African Constitution.195 
As a result, electrification, especially in vulnerable areas and communities is an imperative to the 
guarantee of the right to housing. This electrification cannot rely on grid extension. Grid extension will 
be feasible for only 40% of the population, and stand-alone and local grid options must deliver electricity 
to 60% of the non-electrified rural areas.196 Grid extension is also a more time-consuming process, in 
addition to a capital intensive one, and rapid expansion will prove challenging, especially in resource 
constrained states.197 As a result, the cheaper and quicker deployment of off-grid energy can make it 
an attractive option to help electrification and the provision of basic housing services. Furthermore, 
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these approaches are not mutually exclusive and off-grid power systems can act as an ongoing 
complement to grid power (if and when it arrives), adding resiliency in the face of often-unstable grids 
in the developing world.198 
 Secondly, it is important to minimize the exposure to hazardous substances to protect the right 
to housing. As we previously discussed, carbon-based power generation releases particulate air 
pollution, which has increased effects for those who live downwind or in the locality. Living close to a 
carbon-based power plant significantly increases hospitalization rates for respiratory diseases, and the 
particulate matter released into the air from this combustion may also contain other heavy metals that 
increase the risk of cancer.199 Similarly, fracking for oil, or other forms of surface-level fossil fuel 
extraction, can lead to contamination of water resources.200 Renewables are not perfect either, but are 
considerably better in terms of localized impacts. It is true that geothermal energy can also lead to water 
contamination, and onshore wind production can cause injuries through noise.201 However, transitioning 
to cleaner renewable energy sources can help minimize localized pollution and exposure to hazardous 
substances for nearby residences.  
 
The Right to Work and Sustainable Energy Transition 
A full-fledged sustainable energy transition will alter the fundamental foundations of our economic, 
social and political system as we know it. This will quite obviously affect jobs around the world, which 
means that it could affect the right to work. How can we ensure the move away from fossil fuels does 
not result in the loss of livelihoods of workers?  
 A just transition aims to take appropriate measures to protect jobs in vulnerable industries. This 
will be important where there is a risk that job losses would simply mean the transfer of carbon-intensive 
activities to other countries, or where organisations are failing to take sufficient steps to prepare for the 
low-carbon transition. Where job losses are unavoidable, adequate support would be needed for people 
and sectors that stand to lose out as a result of decarbonising the economy through compensation and 
retraining for new employment opportunities.202 This will require positive measures by states to provide 
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vocational retraining and information to affected workers so that they can transition to cleaner jobs. 
Historically, fossil fuel job losses have been the result of mechanisation and the declining economic 
viability of fossil fuel extraction, but this will be replaced by climate policy and the falling costs of 
renewable energy.203  
 But this restructuring of the economy also brings opportunity for new jobs in new renewable 
sectors and for “green” economic growth. Besides positive environmental effects related to reductions 
in GHG emissions, increased spending on renewable energy infrastructure could potentially have the 
effect of an economic stimulus.204 A recession brought on by failing fossil fuel industries could be 
remedied through this stimulus effect – a Keynesian macro-economic ideal that has regained relevance 
following its effectiveness in many economies after 2008. Creutzig and others argue that in the 
European context, focusing renewable infrastructure deployment in the peripheral countries where 
there is significant potential for energy production could provide enough stimulus to mediate the debt 
crisis.205 Renewable deployment has had the effect of employment upticks in other places already. In 
2017, solar produced twice as many jobs as coal in the US.206 The UNFCCC estimates that the 
transition to renewable energy will create a net employment gain of 0.5-2% (15-60 million jobs globally) 
with many of these new jobs in emerging economies.207 Renewable deployment will create additional 
jobs in industrial manufacturing sectors.208 Being a major oil producer furthermore does not necessarily 
equate to significant levels of employment; less than 2,000 people are employed in the oil and gas 
industry in the Niger Delta.209 Similarly, jobs in clean energy may also be of a higher quality than those 
in fossil fuel-based power production, where for example, working on wind farms may be safer and 
healthier for workers than in coal mines or combustion plants.210 As a result, state action on investing 
in the sustainable energy transition and surrounding infrastructure can help fulfil the right to work, when 
coupled with measures for vocational retraining and proper dissemination of information for job seekers. 
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Sustainable Energy Transition and The Right to Science 
The Right to the Benefits of Scientific Progress can help reinforce moves toward the sustainable energy 
transition in a few ways. As was described earlier, this right imposes an obligation on developing states 
to invest in inexpensive technological solutions to improve the lives of marginalized and vulnerable 
communities. Decentralized and off-grid solutions seem to fit this bill. Small-scale, distributed 
installations currently deliver energy more cheaply as they do not have to account for the costs of 
building and maintaining the electricity grid and offer individuals and households a more personal, 
hands-on relationship with the production of energy.211 Local ownership of these solutions can also lead 
to generating income from surplus energy, although questions still remain as to the capacity for these 
to generate enough income to cover operation and maintenance costs.212 Localized grids furthermore, 
are documented as offering more stable electricity prices than those of national grids that are subject 
to market fluctuations and when electricity is accessible to local populations, this may spur economic 
development.213 
 The obligations for technology development and transfer (Art 10) embedded in the Paris 
Agreement may help promote the right to science. To implement the innovation and deployment of 
technology for mitigation and adaptation, there must be enhanced research and development in both 
developed and developing countries, with scope for easy transfer of these technologies. Enhanced 
R&D, new and improved technologies and reductions in cost are essential to underpin global climate 
action efforts. It is especially important in developing countries, to adapt new technologies and 
deployment models to local needs.214 Developed countries must support deployment in developing 
countries through enhanced finance, technology sharing and capacity building – the latter being an 
obligation through Article 11 of the Paris Agreement. 
 One possible barrier to effective technology transfer is in the case of restrictive intellectual 
property (IP) regimes. Proponents of IP regimes argue that intellectual property regimes do not actually 
cause barriers, and even if they do, they are not as significant as trade barriers.215 However, rationally 
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thinking, IP regimes can definitely cause impediments to effective technology transfer for climate action 
as they vest power to their holders to limit the availability and use of technology behind high acquisition 
and licensing fees. Scholars have noted that high licensing fees, protected by trade obligations related 
to IP, may also be contributing to the insufficient transfer of technology.216 Amongst emerging 
economies, some have drawn parallels between the role of IP in climate technology transfer and IP 
during the AIDS epidemic, where IP associated with effective drugs prevented their dissemination in 
developing states, particularly in Africa.217 It is thus an imperative that IP regimes, recognising the full 
scale of the challenge of climate change, do not create a barrier to technology transfer and the 
realization of the right to science.  
 
Sustainable Energy Transition and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
There are several guarantees and provisions toward the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights in the 
human rights framework, as was outlined earlier. The primary ones to remember are FPIC and the right 
to their culture. This can obviously manifest in various ways, but significant issues here are the close 
connection of indigenous people to their land and traditional ways of living. Often these rights are 
violated by companies and infrastructure projects, the relentless onslaught of energy companies being 
amongst them when natural resources are there to be harvested in indigenous lands. While there has 
been a long history of fossil fuel companies clashing with local and indigenous communities, it appears 
that renewable companies have followed the path into the same controversies. 
 Before her murder, indigenous activist Berta Caceres wrote a letter to the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples. In this letter she urged the Rapporteur to visit her 
community in Honduras, to investigate “the severe violation of individual and collective human rights of 
indigenous peoples” in the country that they perceived from the development of the Agua Zarca 
hydroelectric dam by the company Desarrollos Energéticos S.A. (DESA). Five months later, she was 
shot and killed in her home. Five men were charged with her murder, two of them with links to DESA.218  
In the Isthmus of Tehauntepec in Oaxaca, Mexico, indigenous women’s rights defender Bettina 
Cruz has been arrested and subjected to violence and death threats for her opposition to wind farms. 
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Local communities allege that these farms were built without the FPIC of affected residents. These 
residents are now experiencing harm to their livelihoods and food security following the loss of 
agricultural land and pollution of fishing waters.219  
These are not isolated incidents but represent a problematic trend in the deployment of 
renewable energy, especially in large-scale renewable infrastructure projects, that does not properly 
consider human rights provisions. The BHRRC reports that “Renewable energy projects, including 
dams and wind farms are associated with serious human rights abuses including in Central and South 
America, East Africa and Southeast Asia. Local communities are faced with some of the most damaging 
impacts including dispossession of their lands, livelihoods undermined, threats and intimidation, killings, 
displacement, among other abuses.”220 When the BRHRRC surveyed 50 renewable energy companies, 
only five responded that they were committed to upholding the standard of FPIC. Three of these five, 
including DESA, have allegations against them that claim the companies did not adequately consult 
and obtain consent from local communities. The distinction between consultation and consent is key 
here: meaningful FPIC goes beyond discussions with the local population and requires the community 
to agree to and give consent for the development of the project which may require the company to 
amend development plans and provide adequate compensation.221 
 In many cases, these problems have arisen in the global South as joint implementation tools 
established under the Kyoto Protocol, such as the CDM, provide incentives for nations of the global 
North to offset their GHG emissions by investing in carbon sequestration and renewable energy projects 
in developing countries. “These projects, like massive monocultural plantations for palm oil production, 
have constituted part of the "land-grabbing" phenomenon through which foreign corporations take 
control of land that had been used by local peoples.”222 
 The CDM is quite problematic in its application but is a widely used and lauded tool for 
increasing mitigation action. Industrialized nations finance mitigation in developing countries because 
it is less expensive than cutting domestic emissions, and host countries accept as it provides an 
opportunity to capture foreign investment. Only about 60% of CDM projects produce renewable energy 
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and the largest number of CDM projects are in hydropower.223 While CDM executives say that only a 
couple of projects out of thousands have allegations of human rights violations, representatives of 
watchdog NGOs like Carbon Market Watch say that this claim is inaccurate.224 Unfortunately, there is 
no complete list of CDM projects that have human rights allegations against them available. “The main 
problem with the CDM has always been that it lacks effective safeguards to ensure that human rights 
are taken into account” says Knox, and with millions (if not billions) at stake in CDM projects, it is no 
surprise that these transactions might be slowed or even undermined by adding local human rights 
requirements into the mix.225 And when indigenous peoples oppose these development projects, they 
become targets of state violence.226 
Hydroelectric dams’ status as a form of “clean” energy production has long been challenged as 
silt and organic materials in the reservoirs’ depths produce toxic and climate-altering methane gas, 
among other environmental damage as well causing human displacements for which dams have 
become so infamous.227 Some argue that these displacements constitute a different type of climate 
refugee, one that is not the victim of rising sea levels but of actions to prevent that, further complicated 
when planned relocation of these people are carried out by multinational development banks with limited 
capacity to fully implement proper resettlement that maintains their communities and restores their living 
standards.228 But what these resettlement plans tend to ignore is the deep connection that indigenous 
peoples have with their land. The indigenous peoples of the Peace Valley, where the Canadian Site C 
dam is planned, invoke the characteristics of unique places with spiritual and cultural significance for 
them- discussing how fishing is a traditional practice that depends on specific places, species, and 
means and how these specific fishing spots are crucial to the community's cultural and subsistence 
activities. Their traditional practices of gathering berries and sacred medicines, holding ceremonies and 
visiting ancestral burial grounds cannot be resettled.229 
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 The renewables rush is necessary and should be welcomed as an effective measure to mitigate 
climate change. But at the same time, human rights obligations toward protecting the rights of 
indigenous peoples’ dictate that climate mitigation projects should not come at the cost of local 
populations and safeguards must be put in place to protect vulnerable communities, such as indigenous 
peoples. Renewable companies and CDM projects alike should be doing more to collect the FPIC of 
local communities. Otherwise, the same issues with fossil fuel extraction will continue to plague 
vulnerable populations. 
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Chapter 5: Cross-Cutting Issues and Conclusion 
 
While the previous chapter outlined the connections between the sustainable energy transition and 
specific substantive human rights, there are some cross-cutting issues that must be considered in order 
to paint a complete picture of the nexus between the energy transition and human rights. This chapter 
will briefly outline some of the inter-connections as they relate to gender equality, equity between states 
and the potential environmental and human rights effects of extractive industries that will still be 
necessary to support the transition to renewable energy.  
 
Gender Equality 
While the potential impacts of climate change are harmful to everyone, women are especially 
vulnerable. Climate change amplifies gender disparities. Women are 14 times more likely to die in a 
natural disaster and are less able to adapt to physical hazards like extreme weather events, flooding, 
drought, and changes in disease vectors. For example, the 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh killed nearly 
150,000 people, 90% of whom were women.230 Due to unequal access to resources and decision-
making processes, women in rural areas are disproportionately affected by climate change and have 
limited mobility in times of disaster. As a result, it is important to identify gender-sensitive strategies to 
respond to climate crises.231 These is by no means an exhaustive list of how climate change can have 
devastating effects on the welfare of women. However, women should not be thought of as merely 
vulnerable victims, they can also be agents of change with important perspectives and knowledge which 
can inform climate action to better consider the needs of women.232  
 In rural areas in developing countries, much of the household thermal energy use is for cooking. 
Most of this energy currently comes from traditional biofuels such as wood, charcoal and agricultural 
wastes, and the collecting and managing of these fuels is traditionally the business of women. With 
environmental degradation, women must travel greater distances and devote more time toward fuel 
collection. 233 Access to sustainable energy would thus eliminate the need for fuel collection, leaving 
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women and girls with more time for productive activities, allowing for more access to income and 
economic development.234 Furthermore, exposure to the combustion of such biofuels means exposure 
to greater levels of indoor air pollution. As a result, it is important for women to have access to cleaner 
energy and appliances, especially cookstoves. It is thus imperative for the deployment of cleantech to 
consider women’s specific priorities and needs, and to use their indigenous knowledge, to ensure more 
effective, user-friendly technological development design, especially when women are going to be the 
ones to primarily use this technology.  
 In addition, women should have the same access to training, credit and skills-development to 
ensure their full participation. Several initiatives are doing this already with positive results. To cite one 
example, Grameen Shakti, a non-profit founded by the Grameen Bank, has supported the installation 
of nearly 800,000 solar home units in Bangladesh by training women as solar technicians who then sign 
annual contracts with homeowners to maintain and service solar units while also providing jobs to 
manufacture accessories for solar home systems. More than 1,000 women have been fully trained in 
these facilities, and thousands more have played related roles in solar construction and installation. The 
solar jobs created by Grameen Shakti have, at once, reduced energy poverty and made many of these 
women the primary wage earners in their families, allowing women to gain economic independence 
while providing power to those living in energy poverty. 235 
 The success of the energy transition in reaching the most vulnerable will require the 
participation of women, who in many cases are the most vulnerable. To use their knowledge and 
perspective in the design and implementation of mitigation measures will ensure a fairer, more 
accessible energy transition while simultaneously helping women overcome systemic barriers to 
economic independence and participation in decision-making.  
 
Equity Between States 
Mitigating climate change requires the reduction of GHG emissions globally, but at the same time, for 
developing countries to develop, their emissions will inevitably rise. This can seem contradictory. Should 
the impending danger of climate change mean that developing countries should be stunted on their 
development trajectory? The answer simply is no, especially as leaving the developing world in energy 
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poverty would go against the doctrine of sustainable development as well as leading to grievous human 
rights violations in a changing climate reality. Additionally, the developing world has contributed very 
little to historic emissions that have led us down this path of anthropocentric climate change, so why 
should they have to be the ones to sacrifice in order to mitigate it? 
 One way of understanding how to create equitable mitigation strategies is to think about it in 
terms of subsistence emissions versus luxury emissions. As Shue puts it “Even in an emergency one 
pawns the jewellery before selling the blankets …. Whatever justice may positively require, it does not 
permit that poor nations be told to sell their blankets [compromise their development strategies] in order 
that the rich nations keep their jewellery [continue their unsustainable lifestyles].”236 For equity to be 
achieved in climate action between those historically responsible and possessing greater wealth and 
capacity, and those who have contributed little to the predicament and possess much less wealth and 
capacity to mitigate, developing states should not have to sacrifice their development so that developing 
countries can maintain their business-as-usual approach. To their credit, the international climate 
regime has always attempted to consider this, especially in their utilization of CBDR to ensure greater 
equity between developing and developed states. 
 This is where a sustainable energy transition can play a pivotal role. To escape poverty, people 
need to use more energy, but using more energy equates to producing more emissions only if no source 
of energy except fossil fuels are accessible and affordable for them. Making alternative, cleaner energy 
accessible and affordable for the poorest populations would mean that there would be no need for 
subsistence allowances for emissions or a debate over mitigation responsibility of developing states.237  
Climate finance will play a crucial role in making clean energy available to developing states, 
and the climate regime will have to play a role in mobilizing the downstream movement of capital from 
developed states to developing states. Developing states must continue to take the lead in reducing 
their own domestic emissions but insofar as those reductions do not fully discharge their overall 
mitigation obligation, they should provide financial transfers to poorer countries where reductions are 
economically viable. Subsistence emissions stop being necessary when financial transfers from wealthy 
nations have made non-carbon energy affordable and accessible in poor nations. When adequate non-
carbon energy is both affordable and accessible, no one will need to generate carbon emissions in 
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order to provide for subsistence.238 Thus, the widespread dissemination of renewable energy can play 
a major role in both lifting people out of poverty and encouraging development, as well as ensuring a 
more equitable burden of global climate action.  
 
Extractive Industries  
One final consideration that must be made in the discussion regarding sustainable energy transitions is 
about extractive industries. While renewable energy seems to present us with a possibility for unlimited, 
clean energy with effectively zero emissions, it is too good to be true. Ramping up deployment of 
renewables will involve a massive quantity of natural resources and extractive industries to provide 
them. Increasing production of the technology and parts that are used to harness energy will require 
extensive mining for rare earth elements and other metals.  
In 2017, the World Bank modelled the increase in material extraction that would be required to 
build enough solar and wind utilities to produce an annual output of 7 terawatts of electricity by 2050, 
which would power roughly half the global economy. From those figures, if we were to achieve zero 
emissions, we would need a staggering 34 million metric tons of copper, 40 million tons of lead, 50 
million tons of zinc, 162 million tons of aluminium, and no less than 4.8 billion tons of iron.239 In many 
cases, extraction will have to increase beyond our current levels. Neodymium extraction, used in wind 
turbines, will have to increase by 35%; silver, essential for solar technology, by anywhere between 38 
to 105%; indium, also used for solar, by 920%; and lithium, still the best battery technology we have, 
by an eye-watering 2700%.240 The issue here is not that we will run out of these elements, but the 
damage from mining and extraction. Firstly, rare earth ores often contain radioactive elements like 
uranium, and the by-products of the extraction process include dangerous gases and radioactive 
wastewater, which is usually stored in tailings ponds. As a result, the extraction process can cause 
serious health risks such as increased risk of developing lung, pancreatic, and other cancers and cause 
environmental damage due to the acid and radioactive waste by-products created from the mining 
process.241 Secondly, is the scale of the operations required. Mining is one of the biggest single drivers 
of deforestation, ecosystem collapse, and biodiversity loss around the world and ecologists estimate 
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that even at present rates of global material use, we are overshooting sustainable levels by 82%.242 
Consider the example of lithium. It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. 
Even at present levels of extraction this is causing problems - in the Andes, where most of the world’s 
lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with 
nothing to irrigate their crops.243  
Even in service to renewable energy production, extractivism ultimately depends upon the 
appropriation and exploitation of ecological resources.244 The potential for environmental damage and 
a reliance on international capital markets is scarily reminiscent of many of the issues and injustices 
that surround fossil fuel extraction today and historically. A just energy transition will require changes in 
the way we extract natural resources to prevent a new scramble for resources where developing 
countries may become subject to a familiar form of resource exploitative colonialism.  
 
Conclusion 
The Paris Agreement ushered in the beginning of a new era of renewed enthusiasm and vigour in 
climate action. Climate change will fundamentally change human society as we know it and represents 
the single largest threat to the protection of human rights worldwide. Climate action has historically been 
disappointing, but we do not have a choice anymore. Action must be taken swiftly and decisively if 
humanity is to survive. We will have no choice but to adapt to a new climate reality, but we must try to 
minimize the effects of this harsh new world by aggressively pursuing climate mitigation. The Paris 
Agreement will not be enough. It represents a start, not an end.  
 The international climate regime’s success will have significant impacts on human rights around 
the world. As a result, one mention in the preamble of Paris is not enough. Both the climate regime and 
the human rights regime must strive for greater integration. This paper attempted to shed light on the 
nexus of these two legal regimes. Human rights law can ensure that climate action is carried out in a 
way that puts people first and protects their rights. The extraterritorial nature of trandsboundary pollution 
and GHG emissions makes it difficult to litigate but the longstanding obligations for international 
cooperation and assistance present in the human rights jurisprudence could serve to not only reinforce 
the need for developed states to help developing states in mitigation and adaptation, but also to commit 
                                                          
242 Hickel (n239).  
243 Ibid. 
244 Howe (n227), 234 
51 
 
and implement their own reductions obligations. The tools of international human rights law, procedural 
guarantees of remedy, consultation, participation and avenues for litigation will play an important role 
in holding states and companies to account for their climate obligations. The protection of those at the 
frontline of the climate crisis is currently underdeveloped in international law, and only a concerted effort 
by both regimes could help solidify it.  
 Central to climate mitigation is the sustainable energy transition. This involves a widespread 
shift away from fossil fuels toward cleaner, less carbon emitting fuels such as solar, wind, hydropower, 
etc. But the energy transition is not just about fuel. It is also about increasing efficiency, innovating new 
distribution systems and ending energy poverty. The energy transition’s relationship with human rights 
is another area of focus that will require much greater attention and scholarship in the coming years. 
This paper looked at how it affects a few different substantive rights: the rights to health, work, housing, 
science and indigenous peoples’ rights. Pollution remains a major health concern and shifting away 
from fossil fuel combustion will help improve the underlying determinants of health. Similarly, 
deployments of decentralised energy systems and moving away from a reliance on grid-based power 
can help deliver healthcare to remote, rural areas where people are deprived. The same logic applies 
to housing where off-grid renewable energy systems can help fulfil the right to housing by increasing 
access of basic energy services. The right to work must be considered as we restructure our currently 
carbon-based economy. Jobs in fossil fuel sectors will be lost, but there will be new opportunities in 
clean energy sectors. States have an obligation to help prepare their workforce for this transition by 
providing retraining programs, access to education and information, and vocational training. The right 
to science can help facilitate the climate regime’s obligations on transfer of technology and capacity 
building for research and development in developing countries, helping foster a new intelligent economy 
based around clean, efficient technologies. It is however imperative that restrictive intellectual property 
regimes do not hinder this. Finally, the renewables rush must consider the needs and welfare of the 
local populations that mitigation measures and infrastructure deployment will affect. Indigenous people 
are historically marginalised and vulnerable, and more must be done to ensure that climate action 
measures and renewable energy companies do their utmost to obtain the free, prior and informed 
consent of these indigenous communities, recognizing the intimate and deep connection they share 
with the land. International project implementation mechanisms such as the CDM must ensure that they 
establish proper safeguards to protect against the violation of human rights.  
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 Gender too will play a role. The renewable energy rush has an opportunity to further the 
economic and social development of women, and at the same time, can benefit greatly by utilising the 
indigenous knowledge of women in designing mitigation measures and clean energy solutions. 
Increasing participation for women will be paramount toward creating effective, accessible and 
affordable clean energy solutions.  
 Climate mitigation must also not serve as an excuse to prevent the development pathways of 
developing states. They have not been the ones to contribute greatly to historic emissions, as developed 
states have. Developed states as a result must take on the onus of leadership in reducing emissions. 
The climate regime has long recognised this as shown in its adoption of the CBDR principle. 
Subsistence is a necessity and energy should not be deprived to those just trying to survive. Here again 
the sustainable energy transition can help promote equity between states. If non carbon-based fuels 
were readily available, the development pathways of developing countries need not actually result in 
greatly increased emissions. Developed states thus must facilitate the downstream mobilization of 
capital and technology to support energy transitions in developing countries so they can develop in a 
more environmentally friendly way than the so-called first world did.  
 Extractive industries too will pose a problem in the future and more research must be done to 
prolong renewable technology lifecycles, recycling essential rare earth elements and other minerals, 
effective waste management and new, more productive methods of extraction to minimize the 
environmental and health costs of such operation. Similarly, battery technology represents another 
frontier that must be pushed along with the efficiency of renewable energy production. Decentralised 
and off-grid solutions must also be invested in as they represent more sensible, cost-effective and timely 
interventions for those living in energy poverty. The energy transition is now irreversibly in motion. 
Human rights must consider how best to deal with the challenges and opportunities of such a 
fundamental restructuring of our global political, economic and social structure.  
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